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CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Czechoslovakia-USSR: Dubcek may go to Moscow later this week. (Page 2)

<u>Poland-Czechoslovakia</u>: Gomulka and most of his colleagues are holding publicly to the line that intervention in Czechoslovakia was necessary. (Page 4)

Israel - Arab States: Border incidents continue.
(Page 6)

Japan: Unresolved leadership differences have seriously impaired the Japan Socialist Party's prospects. (Page 7)

<u>Senegal</u>: Government and students reach compromise agreement. (Page 8)

Jamaica: Prime Minister Shearer's political problems are increasing. (Page 9)


East Germany - Berlin: Travel restrictions (Page 11)

USSR-Czechoslovakia: AN-22 in service (Page 11)

Nigeria: Military developments (Page 13)

Latin America: Cuba and the OAS (Page 13)

Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A012100080001-8



South Vietnam: The Communists yesterday hit hard at allied positions in I Corps and north of Saigon.

A US Marine company in northwestern Quang Tri Province lost 25 killed and 126 wounded from an intensive mortar and ground attack northwest of the "Rockpile." A South Vietnamese command post near Hoi An in Quang Nam Province was overrun, but the Communists were routed after 24 hours with losses of 186 killed compared with government casualties of 37 killed and 101 wounded.

The fighting near the "Rockpile," where large enemy weapons caches continue to be uncovered, could indicate enemy plans to lay siege to this US strongpoint. On the other hand, the heavy combat losses suffered by enemy forces in the Da Nang - Hoi An area in the past two days should further limit the Communist potential against the populated centers in Quang Nam.

In the III Corps area, meanwhile, attacks on US positions in Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia provinces were beaten off with Communist losses of over 200 killed. The Communists' latest upsurge could reflect efforts to position their forces closer to Saigon. Agents report the capital may be subjected to shelling and ground probes this weekend.

Czechoslovakia-USSR: Czechoslovak television is portraying Dubcek as a "national hero," apparently hoping to convince the Russians that replacing him might generate strong public reaction.

Dubcek, and other Czechoslovak leaders will go to Moscow "late this week," according to an unconfirmed press report. While there has been no official announcement of the trip, Premier Cernik stated after returning from his 10 September visit to the Soviet capital that a high-level delegation would soon go to Moscow to negotiate the withdrawal of occupation troops.

Should such a trip materialize, the Soviets probably will take the Czechoslovaks to task for their efforts to depict the Soviet-imposed restrictive measures as "temporary." One topic sure to come up in such a meeting would be the failure of Czechoslovak media to submit fully to restrictions. Another likely topic is the 14th congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which, according to an unconfirmed report, is scheduled for December and will elect a new party leadership.

The occupying powers appear to be permitting a resumption of tourism, which is important to Czecho-slovakia's economy. The Soviets, however, will attempt to limit the influx of tourists under the pretext of preventing the entry of "counterrevolutionary elements." According to a censored version of Rude Pravo, the party daily, the occupying powers will not impose new restrictions on Czechoslovaks who want to travel to the West.

The US military attaché in Czechoslovakia, who visited Prague's Ruzyne airport on 15-16 September, has reported that most of the estimated 7,500 Soviet troops encamped there last week have left. There is no evidence available that the Soviets are making a

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large airlift out of Czechoslovakia. Some of the troops at Ruzyne, however, may have been flown out of the country on supply transports returning to the USSR. No other significant change in the situation of the occupying forces has been detected.

Poland-Czechoslovakia: Party leader Gomulka apparently has persuaded most of his colleagues and at least one of his rivals to hold to the line publicly that intervention in Czechoslovakia was necessary.

Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz, in speeches over the weekend to factory party organizations in Warsaw, echoed the standard line. They pointed out that intervention was necessary because the alliance between "revisionism" and "imperialist subversion," encouraged mainly by West Germany, had undermined the leading role of the Czechoslovak party. Both claimed that the Polish party, subjected to the same "challenge" earlier this year had repulsed these efforts, but that it must remain vigilant.

On 15 September, party secretary and hard-line factional leader Moczar, in his first public address since the Warsaw Pact intervention, took much the same line. Provincial party leader Gierek, Moczar's rival for Gomulka's mantle, has also spoken on the Czechoslovak issue within past weeks. None of his remarks have been reported in full by Polish media, suggesting that he may not have taken the official line, even in public.

Gierek and Moczar, who are both nationalistically oriented, are not likely to have favored Polish participation in the Warsaw Pact intervention. Others within the leadership also reportedly were of two minds about the move. Recent speeches by most of these party leaders, however, have also endorsed the official line.

Dissension within the leadership over the Czech-oslovak issue undoubtedly continues despite the facade of solidarity. In a private interview with

Foreign Minister Winiewicz hinted "off the record" that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a "mistake."

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Winiewicz, like others within the regime who are close to foreign political and economic affairs, fears the impact of Polish participation in the invasion on Warsaw's relations with the non-Communist world.

18 Sep 68

Israel - Arab States: Incidents are continuing along the Arab-Israeli borders, but no major new Israeli reprisals have yet occurred.

Israeli forces on 16 September again used the Soviet 130-mm. artillery captured during the June 1967 war to shell the Jordanian town of Irbid after an exchange of fire. The Israelis claim the Jordanians fired first on Israeli settlements. Israelis have openly declared that their move was retaliatory. This shelling incident was limited in comparison to earlier retaliatory strikes, however.

For the first time in several months, Arab terrorists have been active along the Lebanese frontier, The Lebanese have consistently attempted to damp down terrorist activity, fearing Israeli reprisal raids over their borders.

The Suez Canal area has been comparatively quiet, despite reports last week that either the Israelis or the Egyptians would mount some major attack there. Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan reiterated on 16 September, however, that it would be a fatal mistake for the Egyptians to try to launch an offensive across the canal, an unlikely prospect at this time.

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Japan: The Japan Socialist Party's inability to resolve leadership differences at a convention last week has dealt another serious blow to its prospects.

The convention was called following the Socialists' poor showing in the upper house elections last July to choose a new leadership and to modernize the leading opposition party's doctrinaire Marxist platform. It recessed inconclusively on 14 September after an all-night display of factional infighting, unprecedented even for the Socialists.

An impasse was reached when the dominant farleft factions allied to hard-line former chairman Sasaki refused to accept the nomination of a moderate reformist to the post of secretary general. Party leaders will now seek to break the deadlock outside the heated convention atmosphere. They may hope to reach a compromise by emphasizing issues that command wide support in the party, particularly opposition to the US presence in Japan and the Far East.

The convention fiasco, which was well covered by news media, has reinforced the Socialist Party's image as one of warring factions unwilling to reshape the party constructively. Continuing ultraleftist intransigence on the leadership issue could in time induce major defections to the moderate Democratic Socialist Party or lead to the formation of a new splinter Socialist party.

Senegal: The government has reached a compromise agreement with dissident students that should avert another major student uprising this fall.

The two-part agreement, announced on 6 and 16 September, follows long negotiations in which representatives of the government, the radical student group that fomented the May 1968 student rebellion, the national parents' association, and the national labor union participated. Among concessions to major student demands is the dropping of the controversial scholarship reform that was a key issue in the student protest last spring. Other moves include reopening several of the schools which were to have remained closed this year at the largely Frenchfunded and administered University of Dakar, and a guarantee of continued academic freedom.

In return for the government concessions, the student group agreed to accept partial rather than complete reopening of the university, which was closed during the crisis, in order that academic reform--including Africanization of the curriculum and administration--can be accomplished. It also commits itself not to engage in a general strike against the university, or a boycott of examinations and scholarships abroad. Both sides agree to work toward a "social detente" and to create conditions for normal operation of the university and lycees.

President Senghor has gone to great lengths to defuse the potentially explosive student situation in order to gain the calm he will need to deal with other major problems facing his government. Although there are indications that a minority faction within the student group opposes the agreement, his concessions, coupled with generous financial assistance, will probably discourage the general student population from supporting the radicals.

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Jamaica: Prime Minister Shearer's extended political honeymoon seems to be over.


Shearer's first year in office following the death of Prime Minister Sangster in April 1967 was free from major political challenges. In the past few months, however, a number of difficult political problems have surfaced. Shearer had to cancel a planned vacation and hurriedly return from an official visit to Canada on 12 September to pressing problems at home.

Increasingly serious labor discontent has led to a rash of strikes. Even the police walked out briefly earlier this month in a dispute over pay. Shearer's ability to deal with labor unrest appears to have been seriously limited by fears in his Jamaica Labor Party that opposition-linked unions will benefit from government action to halt the strikes.

Shearer is also faced with differences in his cabinet over Jamaican membership in the Organization of American States, participation in Caribbean regional organizations, the establishment of a consulate in Cuba, and financial relations with Britain. Division over these issues has been compounded by long-standing rivalries in the cabinet, particularly between ambitious Minister of Finance Seaga and Minister of Trade and Industry Lightbourne.

Public discontent with the government was illustrated by the demonstrators who greeted Shearer's return with complaints about increased living costs, unemployment, and the breakdown in public services. Shearer's problems will be exploited by the opposition, which has been increasingly effective in recent months.

Soviet AN-22 Transport Being Used in Czech Operation



AN-22 AT MOSCOW AIRSHOW - 1967

The AN-22 can carry 176,000 lbs or 500 troops The normal load is 99,000 lbs for 5,000 miles

SOVIET AN-22

Fuselage Length - 187 ft. - 19.5 ft. Diameter

Wing Span - 210 ft.

US BOEING-707

Fuselage Length - 139 ft. Diameter - 12 ft.

- 131 ft.

Wing Span

US

LOCKHEED-C-5A

Fuselage Length - 230 ft. - 22 ft.

Diameter

Wing Span - 222 ft.

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NOTES

East Germany - Berlin: In another apparent move to emphasize its "sovereignty," Pankow has imposed new controls on the access of West Berliners and West Germans to East Berlin. On 13 September the East Germans ruled that, unless physically handicapped, residents of West Berlin who have "hardship passes"—such as for visiting sick relatives—can cross the Wall at only one rather than the four crossing points allowed previously. Earlier, on 9 September, Pankow had eliminated four of the original six crossing points for the very limited number of West Germans with permanent passes. Allied access to East Berlin is not affected by these new control measures.

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USSR-Czechoslovakia: The AN-22, the world's largest operational transport aircraft, has been detected for the first time being used in its role of supporting Soviet military forces. Western attachés have reported seeing AN-22s on several occasions at the Prague airport. The Soviets have built 12 AN-22s, and as many as five of the heavy transports are operating with Soviet Military Transport Aviation.

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
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18 Sep 68

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Central Intelligence Bulletin



Nigeria: Owerri, one of the few towns remaining in Biafran hands, was captured by federal forces on 16 September. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, the most successful federal military commander, whose Third Marine Commando Division has overrun most of southern Biafra, will probably head next for the capital of Umuahia. The Biafrans, however, still show no signs of giving up and continue to inflict heavy casualties on federal forces.

Latin America: Cuba's readmittance to the Organization of American States is again being discussed, but early action on the matter seems unlikely. Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes, who is a freewheeler on foreign policy issues, recently suggested that Uruguay and Chile consider ways to bring about Cuba's re-entry in the organization, but the initiative was received coldly by the Uruguayans. Chilean President Frei, on the other hand, said during a visit to Brazil earlier this month that he did not want to see "the Cuban experiment" repeated in Latin America and that Cuban integration would depend on Cuba's accepting "the rules of the game." Valdes subsequently stated that Chile would not oppose Cuba's readmission if that country adopted a "system of friendly relations" and all countries of the hemisphere agreed. Neither condition is likely to be fulfilled in the near future.

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